Democracy, local election, and political dynasty in Indonesian politics by Mariana, Dede & Husin, Luthfi Hamzah
Vol. 2, No. 2, Oktober 2017: 88 - 97Jurnal Wacana Politik - ISSN 2502 - 9185
DEMOCRACY, LOCAL ELECTION, AND POLITICAL DYNASTY 
IN INDONESIAN POLITICS
Dede Mariana dan Luthfi Hamzah Husin
Departemen Ilmu Politik Universitas Padjadjaran
E-mail: d.mariana@unpad.ac.id
ABSTRACT
Liberal democracy has been chosen as a model and political mechanism after Soeharto era. One of its triumph 
is the rise of local election which becomes a political instrument of democratisation at regional level. Many 
scholars believe that local democratisation in Indonesia enables local people to involve more actively in the 
political process. This political exercise in some cases, however, created paradoxical impact on Indonesian 
political realm today, as some practices of political dynasty frequently emerge. Using participatory point of 
view, this article aims to discuss why the phenomena of political dynasty can possibly emerge within a local 
election, what factors are causing it to appear and how it affects the future of local democracy in Indonesia. 
Through the literature studies, we argue that although the liberal democratisation in Indonesia is successful 
in making local politics institutionally more democratic, it still suffers a lot of deficiencies and limitations 
especially in terms of accommodating the participation of local people.     
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DEMOKRASI, PEMILIHAN KEPALA DAERAH, DAN DINASTI 
POLITIK DI INDONESIA
ABSTRAK
Demokrasi liberal telah dipilih sebagai sebuah model dan mekanisme politik pasca era-Soeharto. Satu di antara 
puncak capaiannya adalah kemunculan pemilihan kepala daerah yang menjadi sebuah instrument politik 
bagi proses demokratisasi pada tataran lokal. Banyak ilmuwan politik meyakini bahwa demokratisasi lokal 
di Indonesia memungkinkan masyarakat daerah untuk terlibat lebih aktif dalam proses politik. Akan tetapi, 
percobaan politik ini dalam berbagai kasus menghasilkan sebuah dampak paradoks pada dunia perpolitikan di 
Indonesia dewasa ini, di mana praktek politik dinasti marak bermunculan. Dengan menggunakan perspektif 
partisipatif, tulisan ini bertujuan untuk mendiskusikan mengapa politik dinasti tersebut bisa dimungkinkan 
untuk muncul di tengah-tengah sistem elektoral, apa saja faktor yang menyebabkan hal itu, dan bagaimana 
dampaknya pada praktik demokrasi di tataran lokal di Indonesia pada masa yang akan datang. Melalui studi 
literatur, kami berargumen bahwa meskipun demokratisasi liberal di Indonesia berhasil untuk membuat politik 
lokal lebih demokratis secara institusional, ia masih mengalami kekurangan dan keterbatasan khususnya dalam 
mengakomodasi partisipasi masyarakat lokal. 
Kata kunci: demokrasi, partisipasi, pemilihan kepala daerah, politik dinasti, Indonesia
PREFACE
After nearly two decades of the fall of 
Soeharto, liberal democratisation in Indonesia 
has steadily proceeded. Some scholar, like Peou 
(2014: 39), argues that Indonesia’s experience 
of democracy, although it has passed many 
political transitions and problems, shows 
a positive trend compared to other young 
democratic states, such as Thailand, Philippines, 
Myanmar, and Iraq. Indonesia has experienced 
improved performance in democracy which 
can be measured from the application of 
decentralisation and local autonomy, the 
emergence and the ability of political parties 
to freely compete within an electoral system, 
the participation of civil society in the political 
process by controlling the state, and the role of 
press media in the public sphere. Apart of the 
democratic euphoria, it can be said that the 
most significant triumph of democratisation in 
Indonesia now is the establishment of liberal 
democratic institutions and procedures as 
the only way to articulate common interests 
(Abdulbaki, 2008).
Such national political landscape is then 
followed by local democratisation agenda. 
Through the Local Government Act Number 
32 Year 2004 that contains the principle of 
decentralisation, people are able to choose their 
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leader at sub-national level by participating in 
direct elections. Political participation in local 
election, therefore, becomes a central issue as it 
determines the quality of local democracy. For 
developmentalist theory, like Lipset, people’s 
participation in democracy is highly determined 
by the economic background they have, and 
accordingly democratisation is always hand in 
hand with development agenda (Tadjoeddin, 
2012). This logic is based on the assumption that 
economic growth can automatically strengthen 
and improve participation in democratisation 
process. Furthermore, local democratisation goes 
hand in hand with the idea of good governance, 
which was introduced by World Bank in the late 
of twentieth century, as the central government 
can deliver power to local government in order 
to make efficient management by applying 
the principles of transparency, accountability, 
participation, and so on. Drawing on this 
theoretical framework, developmental theorists 
strongly believe that participatory problem we 
are facing now in Indonesia could be solved 
as the economic growth arises and the good 
governance principles are applied at local level.
Practically speaking, however, local 
election in Indonesia has caused some new 
problems. According to research conducted 
by Trajano and Yoes (2013), Indonesian local 
democracy in some cases tends to grow political 
dynasty that can obstruct the democratisation 
process. There is a tendency among local 
political actors to build their political dynasty 
and monopolise the electoral system by 
transferring power to their family members, 
for instance Atut Chosiyah’s dynasty in Banten 
and Yasin Limpo’s dynasty in South Sulawesi. 
Moreover, this kind of tendency is often related 
to corruptive behavior. In late 2016, there 
were two heads of local government arrested 
by Indonesian Commission for Corruption 
Eradication (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi 
or KPK). Atty Tochija, who was the Mayor of 
Cimahi at the time, and her husband, who was 
the previous two-period Mayor of Cimahi, were 
arrested (Sawitri, 2016). After a short time, Sri 
Hartini as the Regent of Klaten, whose husband 
was also the previous Regent of Klaten, was 
also arrested due to involvement in bribery case. 
(Artharini, 2017).          
The practice of political dynasty is not 
only prone to corruption action, but also hijacks 
people’s participation at the same time. As they 
build their kinship connection and maintain 
status quo, there is a necessity to perpetuate 
patron-client relation and monopolise the 
electoral system. According to Trajano and 
Yoes (2013: 2), the ultimate cause of political 
dynasty, especially in the young democratic 
state like Indonesia, is ‘the weak political 
party institutionalisation.’ Seen in this light, 
local political parties seem to be failed as they 
cannot aggregate their constituent’s interest 
and nominate an alternative leader. A dynastic 
family, therefore, is enabled to occupy the 
structure of political party and undermine 
people’s participation in political process. This is 
not surprising that political dynasty can possibly 
emerge, since political party is the main vehicle 
in liberal democracy.     
Given the case of political dynasty above, 
it can be said that the implementation of liberal 
democracy in Indonesia suffers critical issues. Is 
liberal democratisation in local level sufficient 
to accommodate people’s participation? If so, 
why does political dynasty frequently emerge 
within an electoral system? What are the factors 
that create the embodiment of political dynasty? 
Furthermore, what are political dynasty’s 
implications to Indonesian’s democracy and 
local election nowadays? In the following 
sections, the discussion here will be strongly 
related to those questions.
Using participatory democracy point of 
view, this article suggests two main arguments. 
Firstly, liberal democracy, especially in the 
context of local level, suffers limitation as it cannot 
really overcome the political dynasty resulted 
by local elections. Thus, the modernisation and 
development agenda through decentralisation 
trajectory cannot necessarily improve people’s 
participation at local level. Secondly, it is argued 
that liberal democratisation at local level is not 
entirely congruent with the local context, even 
in some ways, it becomes a new kind of political 
instrument to castrate people’s participation.      
METHOD
This study uses literature review as a 
method to explain the case of political dynasty 
in Indonesian local elections. We collect 
some theories, perspectives, and findings 
from literatures that are strongly related to 
the topic, such as peer-reviewed journal 
articles and main political theory books. In the 
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analytical framework, we first begin the study 
by constructing the theoretical assumptions, 
especially from the theory of participation in 
democracy and of oligarchical democracy 
in young democratic state. These theoretical 
assumptions are important to guide the analysis 
of the phenomenon of political dynasty. Second, 
we then observe the phenomenon of political 
dynasty in Indonesian local election by searching 
some press’ reports and literature’s findings. As 
the focus of the study, our central point is the 
political dynamics of decentralisation and local 
autonomy in Indonesia after 2004.
RESULT AND DISCUSSION
Participatory Problem In Indonesian Local 
Democracy
Talking about the cause of political 
dynasty in a democratic system is not simply 
because of the weakness of liberal democratic 
institutions, as modernist theorists propose. It 
is not also simply caused by the low economic 
growth that local people have, as developmental 
theorists suggest. Rather, we argue that there 
is a paradigmatic fallacy in how we practice 
and apply liberal democracy in the context 
of Indonesian’s experience. To develop this 
critique, it is important to firstly notice the 
work of Pateman, who emphasises Rousseau’s 
classical theory of participation in democracy. 
As she notes in Participation and Democratic 
Theory (2014 [1970]: 22), 
‘Rousseau’s political theory hinges on the 
individual participation of each citizen in 
political decision making and in his theory 
participation is very much more than a 
protective adjunct to a set of institutional 
arrangement; it also has a psychological 
effect on the participants, ensuring that there 
is a continuing interrelationship between the 
working of institutions and the psychological 
qualities and attitudes of individuals interac-
ting with them.’
Participatory theory, according to Rous-
seau, criticises the concept of representation in 
democracy which merely depends on limited 
representative institutions. Vice versa, Rousseau 
emphasises individual’s participation in political 
process regardless the differences existing in 
society. In the light of this perspective, therefore, 
local representative institutions, such as, local 
government, local election, and local political 
party, can be considered to be insufficient to 
accommodate people’s participation as they 
delegate political mandate and decision-making 
process to certain actors or elites at the higher 
level of political institutions. By way of contrast, 
‘the theory of participatory democracy is built 
around the central assertion that individuals 
and their institutions cannot be considered in 
isolation from one another’ (Pateman, 2014 
[1970]: 42). 
Accordingly, in the context of political 
dynasty, Schumpeterian model of democracy 
at local level can be easily misused by 
political elites because the political instrument 
institutionally separates people’s direct parti-
cipation with their institutions. This political 
landscape, hence, enables any dynastic 
family to emerge and utilise the electoral 
system in order to perpetuate their patronage 
linkage. As there is no political equality on 
every social element to equally participate in 
decision-making process, political elites which 
embodied in a dynastic family can easily 
manipulate the game of liberal democracy and 
monopolise it.
Strictly speaking, for participatory democ-
ratic point of view, the ultimate cause of why 
the political dynasty still emerges within a 
democratic society is the failure of liberal 
democratic arrangement to really accommodate 
people’s participation in local democracy, and 
therefore, modernisation and development 
agenda, which are strongly promoted by liberal 
democrats, have been also proven to fail in 
regard of improving people’s participation at 
local level. The paradigmatic fallacy here is not 
only found in the concept that liberal democrats 
impose, but also in the existing liberal democratic 
institutions and procedures as the only way to 
articulate politics in local democracy. Hence, 
in the context of local election, there is no 
political guarantee that people’s representatives 
in electoral system can necessarily represent 
their constituents and make a decision for the 
sake of them. People’s participation cannot be 
simply reduced by solely depending on their 
involvement in local election and neglecting 
their direct participation and control outside 
‘proceduralism’ horizon.       
Moving beyond Rousseau’s participation 
theory, we ought to consider Hirst’s theory 
91Democracy, Local Election, and Political Dynasty in Indonesian Politics
of associational democracy, who develops 
the concept of participatory democracy to 
be more realistic to be applied in modern 
society. For him, associational democracy 
‘always presupposed the plurality and 
autonomy of enterprises and collective bodies 
as decision-making agencies. It assumed a 
system of cooperatively and associatively-
owned agencies that were to be managed by 
procedures which depended on democratic 
consent’ (Hirst, 1988: 141). Borrowing his 
theory, therefore, we ought to reformulate 
Rousseau’s necessity of individual-based 
participation to be more associational, as it can 
be more practical to control and prevent every 
dynastic or patrimonial potential and escape 
from the logic of individualism as the core 
value of liberal democracy.
Seen in this light, the concept of 
‘participation’, which was perceived as 
merely a political procedure by voting and 
then nominating a representative, now turns 
to become more political. This kind of 
associational participation eventually enables 
to prevent the embodiment of political dynasty 
as they have to deal with the social control held 
genuinely by people. Every social association 
within local people can organise themselves 
and make an autonomous body ‘to set their own 
objective’ (Hirst, 1988: 142). To do this theory 
more practically, local democracy, including 
local electoral system, ought to be reformulated, 
so it will not be trapped in a narrow and 
limited representative institutions and enable 
to accommodate people’s participation more 
widely.  
The Incongruity of Local Democratisation 
Agenda
Although democratisation process at 
local level has been successful to make local 
politics more institutionally democratic, there 
is a profound tendency of political dynasty 
resulted by local elections as discussed in the 
previous sections. This political phenomenon, 
in some ways, can jeopardise the ongoing 
democratisation process at local level, while, 
at the same time, shows us the limitation 
and deficiency of liberal democratisation. 
Accordingly, some critical issues arise: why 
does the dream of liberal democratisation at local 
level eventually castrate people’s participation 
and even enable a political dynasty to arise? Is 
then the idea of liberal democratisation in local 
democracy, as a single political articulation, 
necessarily congruent with the nature and the 
political reality of Indonesian politics? Drawing 
on the theoretical framework of participatory 
democracy, we strongly argue that the imposition 
of local democratisation agenda followed by the 
establishment of liberal democratic institutions 
is far from the ideal participatory condition, so 
it is arguably prone to abusive action, especially 
the practice of political dynasty. To scrutinise 
the argument more deeply, there are three main 
problems in Indonesian local politics that liberal 
democratisation cannot successfully overcome.
Firstly, Indonesian’s experience of 
democratisation nowadays still has to deal 
with the problem of oligarchical culture. 
As the work of Fukuoka (2013: 52), which 
explores the oligarchy literature on Indonesian 
democratisation, notes ‘political transition in 
Indonesia as a journey to an illiberal type of 
democracy: namely, oligarchical democracy.’ 
Accordingly, liberal democratisation in Indonesia 
is failed to overcome the old structure of 
oligarchs, as ‘political contestation remains 
confined to a competing predatory interests, 
leading to the marginalisation of civil 
society forces’. These oligarchical structures, 
according to him, were not really eliminated 
by the reformist force in 1998, rather, they re-
organise themselves to merge into a democratic 
atmosphere (Fukuoka, 2013). As the result, the 
oligarchs can easily perpetuate their patronage 
linkage and manipulate the electoral system and 
the liberal democratic arrangement. Hence, if 
we look at the political dynasties now, it can be 
ensured that they are always a part of the old 
oligarchs before democratisation era.
The reorganisation of the old oligarchs, 
as Fukuoka (2013: 57-58) points out, evokes 
a lot of scepticism on the ambition of liberal 
democratisation in Indonesia. Instead of conti-
nuously promoting the so-called democratic 
consolidation by strengthening liberal democ-
ratic institutions, some scholars, like Hadiz (2003: 
592), argue that ‘the legacy of authoritarian 
rule remains important even as the institutional 
structures of authoritarian regimes unravel.’ 
The existence of the ‘democratic form’ of the 
old oligarchs makes liberal democratisation 
remains problematic. Under their co-optation of 
resources and accumulation of money, electoral 
system can never be a fair political battlefield 
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for every political actor as there is a latent 
inequality. This condition is even compounded 
as the oligarchs are also the embodiment of 
local predatory markets who take benefit from 
so-called ‘development and modernisation 
agenda’. As Hadiz points out, ‘decentralisation 
has had little bearing in terms of pushing forward 
a governance agenda based on transparency and 
accountability, as neo-institutionalist propose, 
but has been instrumental in the development 
of newly decentralised, predatory networks of 
patronage’ (2004a: 699).
This remaining oligarch, which mostly 
embody as dynastic family, cannot be captured 
by the single political mechanism of liberal 
democracy, as their existence keeps maintaining 
the status quo and neglecting people’s 
participation within a pseudo-democratic system. 
Seen in this light, therefore, liberal democratic 
arrangement in Indonesian local context has 
some difficulties and limitations, considering 
the nature of Indonesian socio-political context. 
The accusation of developmental theorist 
that the emergence of political dynasty is 
necessarily caused by the lack of economic 
growth cannot be accepted since the economic 
development even contributes to accumulate 
resources and money for the political dynasties 
itself. Hence, the local oligarchs and dynastic 
families are often comprised of local capitalists 
and businessmen as well. In this regard, Hadiz 
(2001: 146) rightly describes that ‘it would 
not be surprising if business interests, local 
and national… …have now diversified by 
supporting new political vehicles in the hope 
of establishing new alliances. One recent study 
concluded that local political elites now largely 
comprise entrepreneurs who ‘matured’ under 
the New Order.’
Secondly, the game of liberal democratic 
arrangement as ‘the only game in town’ 
(Abdulbaki, 2008: 161) is eventually captured 
by local political elites, especially political 
dynasty. Considering the nature of oligarchy in 
our local society, as discussed above, it is difficult 
to separate the structure of dynastic family 
with the structure of local liberal democratic 
institutions. As electoral system becomes the 
only way to articulate political interest, local 
people are solely dependent to political elites 
ruling in the electoral institutions, such as local 
political party, local representatives, etc. Again, 
the logic of representation in Schumpeterian 
model of democracy here is always problematic 
in terms of people’s participation. The electoral 
system at local level does not only become a 
political instrument to mediate conflict, but also 
at the same time becomes a new hegemonic 
instrument to exclude people’s participation. 
Thus, liberal interpretation of participation here 
is conceptually degraded as merely an electoral 
involvement and political gimmick. Hadiz 
(2003: 593), in this regard, points out that ‘the 
institutions of Indonesia’s new democracy have 
been captured by predatory interest precisely 
because these were not swept away by the tide 
of reform.’
Elite capture mentioned above is, of 
course, contrary to decentralisation’s goal, which 
was promoted by World Bank and international 
movement after the Cold War ended, that 
‘a vibrant civil society contributes to good 
governance and democratisation by ensuring 
greater public participation in development… 
…decentralisation is usually assumed to 
provide better opportunities for participation 
by local communities in decision-making’ 
(Hadiz, 2004a: 700). Against this paradox, 
thus, the developmental theorists’ refutations, 
which solely problematise the weakness of 
liberal democratic institutions and ‘the lack of 
commitment among political elites’ (Hadiz, 
2004a: 704), are irrelevant, since electoral 
system and its derivations, which simply reduce 
and degrade people’s participation, can easily 
captured by a ‘democratic’ form of political 
dynasty. For instance, a research conducted 
by Hamid (2014: 584) shows how Chosiyah’s 
dynasty dominates some democratic institutions 
in Banten as shown in the figure 1.  
Drawing on the chart, Hamid (2014: 590) 
argues that, in the context of Banten, family 
linkage becomes ‘the single most important 
actor that determines the distribution of political 
power and economic resources at the local 
level.’ It can be clearly seen that Chosiyah’s 
dynastic family dominate in various political 
institutions, either the local executive or the 
local representatives. Moreover, this family 
linkage also spread out among economic cartels 
and local bossism called jawara (Hamid, 2014: 
580-585). That analysis has proven that liberal 
democratic institutions are again failed to really 
overcome the tendency of political dynasty at 
local level. 
Accordingly, we ought to rethink the 
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Figure 1. The Dynastic Family of Chasan Shohib in Banten
Source: Hamid, 2014: 584 
idea of decentralisation per se more critically, 
as people’s participation, in terms of political 
control and involvement in decision-making 
process, has been neglected. This is in line 
with Hadiz’s argument that:
‘…there have been dramatic changes in 
Indonesia. Electoral politics have become 
far more important, as have institutions 
like political parties, the MPR and national 
and regional parliaments as arenas of 
political competition… …But what we are 
probably seeing is a transition to a system 
of money-politics in which oligarchic 
interests, some old and some new, may find 
means of reconstituting themselves. These 
developments are partly attributable to the 
absence of effective organising vehicles 
representing groups…’ (2001: 143).
This deficiency of decentralisation, indeed, 
gives profit to local oligarchs including political 
dynasty to capture the electoral system. In line 
with the discussion in the previous factor, a 
political dynasty can maximise its accumulated 
resources to influence voters’ choice, and, 
moreover, force them by using patron-client 
mechanism and political intimidation (Hadiz, 
2004b: 617). As Fukuoka puts in, ‘money now 
plays a crucial role in elections, the electoral 
process has created ‘business bias’ which 
effectively marginalises civil society leaders 
who may have the potential to become effective 
politicians but lack of the financial means to 
contest increasingly expensive elections’ (2013: 
61). 
Thirdly, the last factor that is neglected 
by liberal democratisation at local level is the 
context of Indonesian’s culture and tradition. 
Indonesian society, especially at local level, 
cannot necessarily emerge and adapt the 
modern form of political system which was 
derived from Western-centred democracy. 
Liberal democracy that embodies in local 
democratic institutions, such as local election, 
local representatives, and local party, inherently 
needs liberal values, like individualism and 
rationalism, in order to create democracy more 
participative. This kind of need, however, 
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contradicts with the nature and empirical reality 
of Indonesian people, specifically at local level, 
which are relatively communal, traditional, and 
collectivist.  Accordingly, using Kuhn’s theory 
of ‘paradigm research’ in criticising liberal 
interpretation of democratisation in Indonesia, 
Fukuoka (2011: 99) contends that ‘despite its 
popularity, liberal theory is not congruent with 
the empirical reality of Indonesia: political 
transition in Indonesia took place even in the 
absence of an assertive civil society.’
The incongruity of liberal democracy, 
therefore, has made some new problem in local 
democracy. Instead of making local politics 
more democratic, local democratisation through 
decentralisation and local election even results 
and facilitates local predatory oligarchs and 
political dynasty to dominate and utilise popular 
vote. Indonesian society’s values mentioned 
before, in some ways, give political profit for 
political dynasty to perpetuate its domination. 
As Hamid (2014: 578) points out, ‘money 
politics and ‘gangsterism’ play a significant role 
in political change.’ The practice of gangsterism 
here becomes an important issue regarding 
political dynasties, as they usually use tradition 
and communal identity to maintain political 
power, and, moreover, use violence to silence 
their political opposition (Hamid, 2014: 585). 
This condition, hence, has led local democracy 
to the absence of strong civil society.   
To sum up, this section basically argues 
that liberal democratisation is incongruent with 
the nature and empirical reality of Indonesia. 
Although local democracy after the policy of 
decentralisation is successful to make political 
process institutionally more democratic, it still 
suffers deficiencies and limitations that have 
been discussed above. The tendency of political 
oligarchy frequently abuses the electoral system 
at local level and utilises it as a political instrument 
to perpetuate its patrimonialism. Furthermore, 
the most important issue, this deviation has 
eventually castrated people’s participation in 
political and decision-making process. 
The Establishment of Local Oligarchy 
And The Absence of Participation
Indonesian’s local democratisation cannot, 
indeed, be regarded as a new political thing, 
as it has proceeded for more than a decade. 
Its implementation, however, still has to face 
some challenges in order to make local politics 
more democratic not only institutionally but 
also substantively. Considering the incongruity 
of liberal democratisation mentioned before, 
it is important to rethink Indonesian’s local 
democracy in the future and also envision its 
prospect in order to overcome the democratic 
obstacles. In this section, we try to identify 
some political effects regarding the crisis of 
participation in local democracy. By doing so, 
Indonesian democrats hopefully can anticipate 
these challenges and, eventually, the process of 
democratisation in Indonesia after 1998 can be 
relatively better.
Firstly, if we do not take the problem 
of participatory seriously in Indonesian local 
democracy, it is not surprising that there will 
be a tendency of political dynasty and the 
establishment of new local oligarchs in the larger 
amount of Indonesian local elections, which 
can eventually jeopardise common interests. As 
Tusalem and Pe-Aguirre (2013: 360) explain, 
‘some scholars argue that the dominance of 
political dynasty in the political arena has a 
pernicious effect on public good provision. The 
underlying logic is that the concentration of 
power within one family negates accountability 
to the electorate and deters challenges from the 
high-quality, reform-oriented candidates.’ The 
embodiment of political dynasty, in some ways, 
can undermine common interest since it will 
prioritise its privilege to gain special access to 
power. As the consequence, there is common 
interest that will be staked. At the local context, 
a political dynasty will only focus to maintain 
and fund its patronage linkage, and, at the 
same time, neglect and corrupt the others’ right 
outside its political circle. 
As the political dynasty has been 
established, political institutions’ performance 
and public services at local level will auto-
matically decrease. Inspired by the Philippines’ 
experience on political dynasty, Tusalem and 
Pe-Aguirre (2013: 366) use Mendoza, Beja, 
Barua, and Venida’s analysis to categorise three 
negative effects regarding public good services: 
‘First, it prohibits citizens from voicing 
their demands, needs, and expectations to 
politicians because a hierarchical culture 
is manifested that promotes a culture 
of deference. Second, dynastic families 
accumulate inordinate amounts of power 
over time, which may them to violate the 
rule of law without fear of losing elections 
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or facing administrative sanctions from 
other state authorities. Third, the political 
selection of leaders emphasises preferential 
treatment of individuals rather than 
emphasising meritocracy’s level playing 
field, thus creating a breed of inexperienced 
politicians who do not have the capacity to 
govern.’         
Hence, the practice of political dynasty 
essentially ruins the goal of local democratisation 
itself, as public services will be sacrificed 
and democratic political circulation will be 
disturbed. Moreover, the rule of law can be 
easily trespassed since political dynasty has 
dominated the political structure. As the result, 
political institutions have to deal with some 
incapable and incompetent politicians who has 
strategic position in deciding public policy and 
common interest.   
Secondly, the consequence that Indonesian 
local democracy will be facing is the lost of 
people control. Liberal democratic arrangement 
in local democracy, as discussed in the previous 
section, limits the political actor by simply 
depending on electoral system and representative 
institutions. Considering the incongruity of 
the nature of Indonesian democracy, people’s 
participation is substantially reduced and even 
politically eliminated from decision-making 
process. Moreover, this institutional catastrophe 
is compounded as civil society at local level 
is traditionally weakened and structurally 
oppressed by violence conducted by political 
oligarchs. As Tusalem and Pe-Aguirre (2013: 
366) note, ‘political families develop linkages 
with clients who have been and will be loyal in 
each and every electoral cycle.’
Against the political landscape above, 
therefore, the true participation, as envisaged 
by Pateman and Hirst, in local democracy can 
never be reached within the narrow and limited 
liberal democratisation. How can we regard 
local democracy to be democratic if the demos 
at local cannot really participate in political 
process? How can we regard development 
and modernisation agenda to be successful 
in terms of improving people’s participation 
if local democracy is eventually captured by 
political elites and dynasty? The problem of 
participation can lead to the nomination of an 
unqualified political leader and biased public 
policy. In the long term, it also can lead local 
democracy to the crisis of leadership, as Hadiz 
(2004a: 705) argues that ‘neo-liberal agenda is 
not going to be driven by a progressive civil 
society, but must be enforced by technocratic 
and managerial interests constructed within the 
state bureaucracy.’       
Thirdly, local democracy, at the end of the 
day, becomes prone to corruption. Some cases 
of corruption which afflicted local Indonesian 
politicians have shown that the practice of 
political dynasty is strongly related to corruptive 
and abusive action. According to Banten’s 
experience, as presented by Hamid (2014: 580), 
there are some dynastic family members who 
officiate as the head of Indonesian Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry (Kamar Dagang 
dan industri Indonesia or KADIN) and 
Banten branch of Indonesian Association of 
Construction Companies (Gabungan Pelaksana 
Konstruksi Nasional Indonesia Cabang Banten 
or GAPENSI). By such position, Chosiyah’s 
father dynasty can obtain several government’s 
projects, and ‘through group of violence he 
fostered and deepened business lobbying for 
government construction projects’ (Hidayat, 
2007, in Hamid, 2014: 580). This makes a 
complicated intersection of interest as the 
ruling dynasty is comprised of kinship interest 
that embodied in political institutions and also 
business interest at the same time. We can also 
see the same corruptive tendency in another 
political dynasty, such as in Cimahi and Klaten.
Broadly speaking, the consequences of 
political dynasty have been now identified and 
they arguably have negative implications for 
the future of Indonesian local democracy. In 
the light of participatory democracy, thus, the 
proceeding liberal democratisation at local level 
is not completely successful to accommodate 
people’s participation and, rather, it can be 
used by political dynasty and local oligarchs 
to perpetuate their domination over the people. 
If Indonesian democrats do not seriously 
reformulate the political arrangement to be more 
participative, this kind of tendency will easily 
spread throughout Indonesian local elections. 
As the result, the worst condition that probably 
Indonesian local democracy has to face is the 
absence of people’s participation, which can 
lead to either kleptocracy or anarchism.  
CONCLUSION
To conclude, this article tries to discuss the 
cause of political dynasty in Indonesian local 
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politics by using participatory point of view and 
criticising the narrow liberal democratisation 
agenda. We have shown in the discussion in 
this article that although liberal democratisation 
is successful in making local politics 
institutionally more democratic, it still suffers a 
lot of deficiencies and limitations especially in 
terms of accommodating participation at local 
level. Accordingly, the idea of modernisation 
and development theory has been proven to 
fail as local oligarchs that embody as political 
dynasty eventually capture the decision-making 
process. This failure, as we have argued, is 
caused by the incongruity of Western-centred 
liberal democracy with the nature and empirical 
reality of Indonesian local politics, which makes 
it cannot be necessarily adopted.  
Therefore, we need to reformulate our local 
democracy to be more participatory in order 
to eradicate the oligarchical structures and 
the widespread corruption at the local level. 
In this regard, some participative variants of 
democracy have been introduced and examined 
to complement the limitation of liberal 
democratisation, for example, the emergence 
of village democracy after the Village Act 
was ratified in 2014. Moreover, we ought to 
strengthen and organise progressive civil society 
to really participate in the political and decision-
making process, so every dynastic potential can 
be easily eliminated.
REFERENCES
Abdulbaki, L. (2008). Democratisation 
in Indonesia: From Transition to 
Consolidation. Asian Journal of 
Political Science, 16:2, 151-172, DOI: 
10.1080/02185370802204099
Artharini, I. (2017). Kasus suap bupati 
Klaten: Ada kaitan dinasti politik dan 
korupsi? (The bribery case of Klaten 
regent: Is there relation between 
political dynasty and corruption?). 
BBC Indonesia, accessed online 
on 6th of February 2017. URL: 
ht tp: / /www.bbc.com/indonesia/
indonesia-38484498 
Fukuoka, Y. (2011). Political change in 
Indonesia. Annual International Confe-
rence on Political Science, Sociology 
and International Relations (PSSIR 
2011), p. 95-100.
                       (2013). Oligarchy and Democracy 
in Post-Soeharto Indonesia. Political 
Studies Review, Vol. 11, p. 52-64, DOI: 
10.1111/j.1478-9302.2012.00286.x
Hadiz, V. R. (2001). Capitalism, oligarchic 
power and the state in Indonesia. 
Historical Materialism, Vol. 8, Issue 
1, p. 119-151.
                        (2003). Reorganising political 
power in Indonesia: A consideration of 
so called ‘democratic transition’. The 
Pacific Review, 16:4, p. 591-611, DOI: 
10.1080/0951274032000132272
                        (2004a). Decentralization and 
democracy in Indonesia: A critique 
of neo-institutionalist perspectives. 
Development and Change 35(4), p. 
697-718.
                        (2004b). Indonesian 
local party politics. Critical Asian 
Studies, 36:4, p. 615-636, DOI: 
10.1080/1467271042000273275
Hamid, A. (2014). A family matter: Political 
corruption in Banten, Indonesia. Asian 
Politics & Policy, Vol. 6, Number 4, p. 
577-593. 
Hirst, P. (1988). Associational socialism 
in a pluralist state. Journal of Law 
and Society, Vol. 15, No. 1, Law, 
Democracy, 7 Social Justice, p. 139-
150.
Pateman, C. (2014 [1970]). Participation 
and democratic theory. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Peou, S. (2014). The Limits and Potential of 
Liberal Democratisation in Southeast 
Asia. Journal of Current Southeast 
Asia Affairs, 33, 3, pp. 19-47.
Sawitri, A. A. (2016). Ketua KPK Minta 
Publik Waspadai Korupsi Dinasti 
Politik (Head of KPK to ask public to be 
aware of dynastic political corruption). 
Tempo.co, accessed online on 6th of 




Tadjoeddin, M. Z. (2012). Electoral conflict 
and the maturity of local democracy in 
97Democracy, Local Election, and Political Dynasty in Indonesian Politics
Indonesia: testing the modernisation 
hypothesis. Journal of the Asia Pacific 
Economy, Vol. 17, No 3, p. 476-497.
Trajano, J. C. I., and Yoes, C. K. (2013). 
Indonesia and the Philippines: Political 
dynasties in democratic state. RSIS 
Commentaries, No. 018. Singapore: 
Nanyang Technological University.
Tusalem, R. F., and Pe-Aguirre, J. J. (2013). 
The effects of political dynasties on 
effective democratic governance. 
Asian Politics & Policy, Volume 5, 
Number 3, p. 359-386.
